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In nite Cardinalities, Measuring Knowledge, and
Probabilities in Fine-Tuning Arguments
Isaac Choi

Abstract
This chapter deals with two di erent problems in which in nity plays a central role. It rst responds to
a claim that in nity renders counting knowledge-level beliefs an infeasible approach to measuring and
comparing how much we know. There are two methods of comparing sizes of in nite sets, using the
one-to-one correspondence principle or the subset principle, and it argues that we should use the
subset principle for measuring knowledge. The chapter then turns to the normalizability and coarse
tuning objections to ne-tuning arguments for the existence of God or a multiverse. These objections
center on the di

culty of talking about the epistemic probability of a physical constant falling within a

nite life-permitting range when the possible range of that constant is in nite. Applying the lessons
learned regarding in nity and the measurement of knowledge, the chapter hopes to blunt much of the
force of these objections to ne-tuning arguments.

Keywords: fine-tuning arguments, infinity, measuring knowledge, multiverse, existence of God
Subject: Philosophy of Religion

Measuring Knowledge
One central element of being an expert involves having signi cantly more knowledge about a topic than the
1

average person. This seems an essential feature of expertise, since if an expert knew less (or roughly the
same amount) about their eld than an average person, we may wonder why we should consult them in the
rst place. We also commonly make comparisons between experts regarding how much they know in a
domain or subdomain. For example, Brian and Beth are both physicians, but as an oncologist, Brian knows
far more about cancer than Beth, a pulmonologist. And it may seem fairly plausible that having more
knowledge must involve having more true beliefs.
But upon closer examination, two potential problems crop up: First, does it actually make sense to say that
someone has more true beliefs than another person? Some philosophers nd the ideas of counting,
measuring, and individuating beliefs problematic. If they are right, it would make it quite di

cult to say

that Jones has more true beliefs than Smith. Second, even if we could coherently say that one person has
more true beliefs than someone else, would this always be su

cient to improve one’s epistemic status? If I

have overwhelmingly many more true beliefs than you, but they all are about trivial and inconsequential
matters, this does not place me in a better position epistemically, nor does it contribute to my expertise.
Resolving these questions is important for understanding whether and how having more true beliefs or
more knowledge contributes to having expertise. In this chapter, I will focus on an objection to the
possibility of someone having more true beliefs than another person. I treat the problems of triviality and
belief individuation elsewhere.

Nick Treanor’s “The Measure of Knowledge” (2013) is the only extended discussion I am aware of that
addresses the problem of measuring a person’s knowledge. He notes that the claim that beliefs are not even
theoretically countable is often made in the philosophical literature, though rarely supported by actual
arguments (2013, 582). If such a claim regarding countability were right, it would y in the face of the
everyday intuitions and practices of non-philosophers when they attempt to compare how much people
know, for example, subjecting students and professionals to academic and licensing examinations. Treanor
illustrates the claim with quotes from philosophers such as W. V. O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Barry
Stroud, and he attempts to spell out why measuring knowledge should be considered problematic.

The most straightforward and natural way to measure how much S knows is to count how many beliefs S
has that are true and possess the properties one considers necessary and su

cient for knowledge. When

comparing people, the person who has the larger number of such qualifying beliefs is the one who knows
2

more. Treanor calls this view the cardinality approach, and he presents several di
di

culties for it. The

culty I will focus on starts by considering the possibility of subjects who have denumerably in nite true

beliefs (2013, 580). Some theories of mental representation entail humans having an in nite number of
3

beliefs. If such a theory turns out to be true, then since the cardinality of every countable in nity is the
same, 0א, every person’s set of true beliefs would have the very same cardinality, even if A had, say, a million
true beliefs that B did not have, while A had all of B’s true beliefs. Treanor says this point is “decisive” if we
switch to talking about ignorance (2013, 581), o ering a reductio that would apply even to beings that have
only nitely many beliefs. Suppose that cardinality is the measure of ignorance. Since there are in nitely
4

many truths, no matter how

many truths I come to believe, I am still ignorant of an in nite number of

other truths (as long as I do not know all truths); the cardinality of how many truths any non-omniscient
being is ignorant of is precisely the same. But I clearly am not as ignorant as my ten-year-old self;
therefore, cardinality cannot be the measure of my ignorance. Treanor treats ignorance and knowledge as
inversely related—knowing more entails being less ignorant—and so if cardinality cannot be the measure
of my ignorance, then it cannot be the measure of my knowledge either.

The correspondence principle and its consequences
Treanor’s argument relies on Georg Cantor’s one-to-one correspondence principle regarding the
cardinality of trans nite sets. This principle states that as long as there exists a one-to-one mapping
between all the elements of two sets, they have an equal cardinality, and it is responsible for some of the
very counterintuitive consequences of his set theory, consequences that made some of his mathematical
contemporaries reject it. Most applicable here is the fact that Cantor’s trans nite set theory results in
concepts of cardinality, equal number, and greater than and less than that run contrary in certain ways to
what we usually mean by them.
A number of these counterintuitive consequences of the correspondence principle were pointed out before
Cantor by a long tradition of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim philosophers arguing against actual in nites. If
actual in nites were impossible, this would support the Abrahamic faiths’ teaching that the universe was
created and not in nitely old, and it would contribute as a premise to one type of cosmological argument for
the existence of God. The earliest known member of this tradition was the Christian philosopher John
Philoponus of Alexandria, who published his de Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum in 529. Philoponus had
previously argued against Aristotle’s views on time and in nity, and in this work he argued for a beginning
to the universe (Sorabji 1983, 198).
One class of arguments against actual in nities, widening gap objections, originates with Philoponus, and
they involve traversals of an actual in nite at di erent rates. A good example is William Lane Craig’s
version of an argument of the medieval Muslim philosopher al-Ghāzāli: In the Ptolemaic system, for each
revolution of the xed stars, thousands of revolutions of Jupiter occur. So the gap between the total number
of revolutions of Jupiter and the total number of revolutions of the xed stars gets ever wider as time passes
and approaches in nity. But after an in nite past, the number of revolutions Jupiter has made is equal in
cardinality (in Cantor’s sense) to the number of revolutions the xed stars have made, resulting in no gap at
all between the two, precisely the opposite of what we would expect (Craig 1979, 98).
Richard Sorabji describes a di erent widening-gap conundrum, courtesy of Nicholas Denyer. We need to
explain “the sense in which a man who has spent 364 days of every past year in hell has spent more time
there than the man who has spent one day of every past year in hell” (Sorabji 1983, 218). Both can say that
they have been in hell an in nite number of days, but should not the rst man be able to say that he has

su ered many more days in hell than the second? Sorabji points out that “however large a nite period we
take, the ratio of days in hell remains at 364:1” (italics in original). When we consider all of an in nite past,
however, the correspondence principle tells us they have spent the same number of days in hell. This is true
no matter how lopsided we make the ratio; we can change the story so that for every billion-year period in
the past, the rst man spends every day of each billion-year epoch in hell except for the very last day of each
epoch, when the second man takes his place for just that day. Yet it seems clear that the rst man has
su ered far more, and if God were to ask us to choose to somehow take on the entire experience of one of
these men from eternity past, there would be no doubt: we would immediately choose the second.

Widening-gap objections rely on the intuition that the behavior of in nite sets should be similar to the limit
case of nite sets as they tend toward in nity. So, for example, in case of the two men and hell, the
di erence between the days they have spent in hell can be expressed as (364n – n), where n is the number of
years that have passed:

lim (364n − n)
n→∞

As n tends towards in nity, the di erence, (364n – n), should also approach in nity. But then at in nity,
the di erence between the total numbers of days suddenly disappears. This expression’s behavior di ers
radically between a potential in nite (the limit case) and an actual in nite, and this sharp disparity presents
a seemingly paradoxical result of applying the correspondence principle.
A di erent class of objections made by these philosophers involves adding to and subtracting from in nite
sets. Addition’s oddness is brought out by Hilbert’s hotel, which has an in nite number of rooms, all of
which are occupied. If a new guest comes and asks for a room, the manager can shift all the guests up one
room, 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and so on, and then put the new guest in room 1. Even an in nite number of additional
guests can easily be accommodated by the hotel, by shifting all the current guests from room n to room 2n.
And this addition of an in nite number of additional guests can be repeated again and again to in nity
without any change in the cardinality of the number of guests residing in the hotel. This is clearly contrary
to our normal concept of addition, but at least it is self-consistent.
Craig argues that subtraction, on the other hand, gives us inconsistent results: Imagine a library with an
in nite number of books, with each book labeled with a natural number. Suppose we take out every other
book. We have removed an in nite number of books, and the number of books left in the collection remains
the same,

since there is a one-to-one mapping between the remaining books and the original set. In fact,

we could repeat this removal procedure an in nite number of times and there would be the same number of
5

books remaining. Yet if we start over with the original library and remove every book with a number greater
than 3—which would be taking out the same in nite number of books as our original removal—then the
in nite library suddenly becomes a nite one (Craig 1979, 86).
This problem with subtracting from in nite sets undermines Treanor’s reductio about our ignorance of
in nite truths. Recall that his argument goes something like this:
(T1) Suppose that cardinality is the measure of my ignorance.
(T2) No matter how many truths I come to believe, I am still ignorant of an in nite number of
other truths given my not possessing omniscience; the cardinality of how many truths I am
ignorant of remains the same.
(T3) But I am less ignorant than my ten-year-old self.
(T4) Therefore, cardinality cannot be the measure of my ignorance.
(T5) Knowing more entails being less ignorant.
(T6) Therefore, cardinality cannot be the measure of my knowledge.
We can construct a parallel argument:
(B1) Suppose cardinality is the measure of the number of books that have not been written by the
human race.

(B2) No matter how many books we write, an in nite number of other unwritten books remain; the
cardinality of unwritten books remains the same.

(B3) But there are far fewer unwritten books now than there were before the rise of writing, with
6

particularly many written in recent centuries.

(B4) Therefore, cardinality cannot be the measure of unwritten books.
(B5) Having more written books entails there being fewer unwritten books.
(B6) Therefore, cardinality cannot be the measure of written books.
This conclusion, however, contradicts the fact that the proper metric of written books actually is counting
7

how many books have been written.

There are at least three problems with Treanor’s argument, the rst two involving subtraction from
in nities: First, he removes all the truths we have come to believe since an earlier time (possibly an in nite
number of truths for certain kinds of minds) from the in nite set of truths we were ignorant of at an earlier
time. Second, to interconvert between ignorance and knowledge in the move from T4 to T6, he has to
assume that he can get the number of beliefs we know by subtracting from the total number of truths the
number of truths we are ignorant of, the latter two sets both being in nite. Since subtraction in Cantorian
8

set theory gives us inconsistent results, both moves are illegitimate.
Finally, and most importantly, Treanor’s reductio does not actually give him what he wants: T4 does not
logically follow from the premises. Instead, if T3 is true, what we should actually conclude from it should be
the disjunction cardinality is not the measure of our ignorance (¬T1) or the cardinality of how many truths I
am ignorant of does not remain the same as I come to believe more truths (¬T2). If one assumes the
Cantorian de nition of cardinality, which relies on the correspondence principle, as being the correct one to
use when dealing with in nite sets, then the second disjunct is false and the conclusion should be the rst
disjunct. But if we had a di erent de nition of cardinality for in nite sets than Cantor’s, one that allows for
di erent sizes of denumerably in nite sets, then the second disjunct could be true: the number of truths I
am ignorant of would decrease as I learned, even while remaining in nite. Many mathematicians and
philosophers assume with Treanor that the Cantorian de nition of cardinality is the right one or even the
9

only one available, but there is a history of thinkers (including Cantor himself in a way) who have
recognized that there are actually several ways that we can de ne the concepts of number and cardinality
for in nite sets.

The subset principle
The major rival to the correspondence principle is the subset principle, which states that a set that is a
proper subset of another set is smaller in size. While both principles always agree in their judgments
regarding relative size when comparing nite sets, they can disagree when it comes to pairs of in nite sets.
This can be illustrated by another class of counterintuitive consequences of Cantorian cardinality: subset
paradoxes. Galileo said that it seems obvious that there are far fewer square numbers (1, 4, 9, 16, … ) than
there are natural numbers, since the square numbers are all natural numbers, forming a proper subset of
the natural numbers, and there are many non-square numbers among the natural numbers. Yet he also
pointed out that the two groups of numbers can be paired o , each square number with its square root, and
so the two groups are of the same size (Galileo [1638] 1954, 32, cited in Parker, 88). Interestingly, Galileo
throws in a widening-gap argument for good measure—the ratio of square numbers to natural numbers
decreases as we get to larger sets of numbers:
Thus up to 100 we have 10 squares, that is, the squares constitute 1/10 part of all the numbers; up to
10,000, we nd only 1/100 part to be squares; and up to a million only 1/1,000 part; on the other
hand in an in nite number, if one could conceive of such a thing, he would be forced to admit that
there are as many squares as there are numbers all taken together.(Galileo [1638] 1954, 32)
Though Galileo does not speak in these terms, once again, there exists a huge disparity between the
behavior of the limit and the in nite.

So the square numbers and natural numbers are of equal size according to the correspondence principle,
while the subset principle says that the set of square numbers is smaller. Which principle should we adopt as
the correct principle for comparing in nite sets? We have several options. Matthew Parker notes that
Galileo anticipates Kant in rejecting both principles (2009, 92), saying that:

This is one of the di

culties which arise when we attempt, with our nite minds, to discuss the

in nite, assigning to it those properties which we give to the nite and limited; but this I think is
wrong, for we cannot speak of in nite quantities as being the one greater or less than or equal to
another. (Galileo 1954, 31)
For Galileo, we simply cannot apply our concepts of relative size to in nite sets. So one option would be to
remain silent on comparisons of such sets. A pair of options involves dropping one of the principles and
designating the other as the one true principle: Cantor obviously held onto the correspondence principle,
while Bernard Bolzano thought the subset principle was the correct one (Moore 2001, 113; Parker 2009, 94–
5). Cantor’s overall approach turned out to be far more mathematically

fruitful and useful than

Bolzano’s, and so his choice between these two intuitions has been widely assumed. Nevertheless, as we saw
above, there are several consequences of this choice that seem paradoxical and go against strong intuitions
we have concerning size. A fourth, “more pluralistic” approach is suggested by Parker, who partially agrees
with Galileo in saying that our everyday concept of numerosity does not apply to in nite sets, but he also
argues that we can de ne at least two di erent extensions of that concept, each utilizing one of the
principles of set size. Neither is “the uniquely right concept,” but each is useful in di erent ways (2009, 91,
Parker’s emphasis).
This last approach seems correct. Since our everyday concepts concerning relative size cannot be used
consistently with in nite sets, we need to decide which of the possible extensions of those concepts is most
suitable and useful with regard to each particular question or domain. So which extended concept should we
use with regard to comparing how much knowledge agents possess? To answer this question, let us consider
what we want to express when we say that person A knows more than person B. What do we actually want
when we ask whether someone knows more than another person? Is it that one could pair o

their true

beliefs to the other’s true beliefs in a one-to-one correspondence? Clearly, it is the latter concept that
interests us.
A few examples should make this even more obvious. Imagine that God has assigned names to each of the
natural numbers. He then discloses to angel A the names of all the natural numbers, while angel B is given
only the names of the even natural numbers. It is obvious that angel A knows far more than angel B, despite
there being a one-to-one mapping between their two sets of beliefs. It does B little good to claim that he
knows as much as A by appealing to the correspondence principle, since there are an in nite number of
questions A can answer correctly (namely, the names of the odds) that B cannot, in addition to A knowing all
the names B knows. If we were playing a game where winning involved knowing the names of randomly
selected numbers, would we be indi erent as to which angel to choose for our team because the
correspondence principle says they know the same number of names? Or would we clearly prefer angel A
because A’s knowledge is a proper superset of B’s and we would be twice as successful in the game if we
went with A?
We can sharpen this preference further by appealing to Cantor’s proof that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the points on a nite line segment and all the points in an in nite threedimensional space (or any n-dimensional space, for that matter), if we associate points with real numbers
(Moore 2001, 118). If angel A knows the temperature at every point in a spatially in nite universe, while
angel B only knows the temperature at every point on a 1mm long line segment situated, say, along one of
the corners of the Empire State Building, it seems absurd and irrational to say that B knows as many truths
as A. If winning a game involved knowing the temperature at a randomly chosen point in the universe,
wouldn’t the choice of which angel to be on our team make an enormous di erence to our prospects of
success?
So when we are thinking about how much subjects know, it seems clear that we want to extend the concepts
of ‘more,’ ‘less,’ and ‘equal’ in the subset direction. This extension

suits our purposes with regard to

knowledge far better than the correspondence extension. Thus my ignorance does decrease in this sense
when I learn new truths, despite the fact that I am still ignorant of an in nite number of truths, since what I
am ignorant of now is a proper subset of what I was ignorant of before I came to acquire a truth previously

unknown to me. And minds that have in nite sets of true beliefs can di er in how many true beliefs they

have.

Non-subset comparisons
Before turning to ne-tuning, let us look at a remaining problem. In a footnote, Treanor does brie y
mention that proper subsets might give us a sense of knowing more or less despite equal in nite
cardinalities, but he says that these kinds of cases would be “too rare to be helpful,” as his ten-year-old
self, while not knowing much of what he knows now, would know many things that his present self no
longer knows (2013, 600, n. 5). Framing this objection in terms of Treanor’s ignorance argument, while the
in nite set of truths I am ignorant of now is possibly a proper subset of what I was ignorant of, say, ten
minutes ago, it is certainly not a proper subset of what I was ignorant of yesterday, since I have forgotten
many trivial details of yesterday’s activities in the intervening time.
Still, it seems intuitively possible to make judgments with regard to relative in nite sizes in certain kinds of
cases where there are no proper subsets involved. Take, for example, a case similar to the two angels case
above, where angel A* knows the names of all the natural numbers, but instead of knowing the names of the
even natural numbers, B* knows only the names of the negative even numbers. In this new case, B*’s true
beliefs do not form a subset of A*’s true beliefs, and yet it seems just as obvious that A* knows more than B*
does.
Or consider the two men in hell scenario, where one man spends 364 days of each year in hell, while the
other only one day per year. If we specify which days of each year that each man is scheduled to spend in hell
—say, the rst man spends every day in hell except for New Year’s Days and leap days, and the second man
spends only New Year’s Days in hell—then we can generate two sets of days spent in hell that are not in the
proper subset relation with each other. But it still seems obvious that one contains many more days than the
other. We can adjust the story so that they are proper subsets of each other, by changing the second man’s
scheduled day to Christmas Days, but merely shifting the scheduled day shouldn’t make a di erence in the
relative sizes of their sets of days spent in hell.
Finally, here is a geometric example. Imagine two line segments, L1, stretching from 0 to 1 along the x-axis,
and L2, stretching from 0 to 2. Both line segments contain an

in nite number of points, but from the

subset extension perspective, L2 contains more points, since it includes every point L1 has and more
besides. Now imagine a third line segment further down the x-axis, L1*, which stretches from 3 to 4. There
is no overlap between L1* and L2, and yet it still seems obvious that L2 contains more points than L1*, since
L1 and L1* share the same length. Another way to think about this example would be to imagine L1* as
simply L1 moved over some distance. Sliding L1 over (while not transforming it in any other way) should
make no di erence in terms of how many points it contains. We can generalize this by noting that we are
able to compare not only the lengths of lines, but also the areas of planes and the volumes of regions of
space. It seems arbitrary and odd to be able to compare the in nite numbers of points within them (using
the subset extension) if one region contains another and not be able to do so if they do not contain each
other or overlap.
The problem arises, however, when we try to justify our intuitions here. In the modi ed angels case, one
reason why we might think that B* has fewer beliefs is because B*’s beliefs regarding the names of the
negative evens in the modi ed story match up one-to-one to B’s beliefs about the names of the positive
evens in the original scenario, where a proper subset relation does exist between A and B’s sets of beliefs.
But if we have dropped the correspondence principle in pursuing an extension of cardinality using just the
subset principle, we cannot appeal to one-to-one correspondence to claim that the numbers of beliefs B and
B* have are the same in both scenarios. Similarly, for the men in hell cases, one might be tempted to try to
show equal size by pointing to a one-to-one correspondence between all the New Year’s Days and all the
Christmas Days.
Still, it may be possible to avoid appealing to the correspondence principle and de ne an extension of subset
cardinality that can apply to sets that are not in the proper subset relation with each other. Not being a
mathematician or set theorist, I can only o er a sketch of some thoughts that could begin to help in
producing such an extension. When relative rates are involved, such as the men in hell cases, we can appeal
to equal relative rates and limit case behavior to avoid using the correspondence principle. The second man
in the hell cases accumulates days in hell at the same rate, one day per year, whether that day is Christmas

or New Year’s. On the subset principle extension of cardinality, limit case behavior correctly predicts
whether the quantities are equal at the actual in nite and which quantity is larger if they are not equal
(unlike on the correspondence principle extension). So since the limit behavior of the total number of days
in hell is the same whichever day we schedule for the second man, we could argue that he su ers the same
total number of days in both scenarios.

It is di

cult to generalize this argument to situations where relative rates and limits are not already

involved, such as the modi ed angels case. We may want to introduce a baseline from which to generate
relative rates, as Galileo did when he pointed out the diminishing ratio of square numbers to natural
numbers as we count up to in nity; in his case, the baseline happens to coincide with one of his sets, but a
somewhat clearer

example would be to use the natural numbers as a baseline to compare the square

numbers with the cube numbers. Or we could use something else that varies together with the quantity we
are interested in; in the geometric example, we used length (or area or volume) as a proxy measure for the
number of points. But these approaches only work when there is such a co-varying measure or when the
sets are already subsets of the baseline. For the modi ed angels case, since one knows the positive integers
and the other knows the negative evens, they do not have a shared baseline for comparison, nor is there
some other variable that we could use to compare their sizes. It seems necessary that we would have to
appeal to a bijection function (utilizing one-to-one correspondence) in order to convert the negative evens
into a corresponding set of positive evens or to convert the positive integers into a baseline of negative
integers for the negative evens. So it seems that we can fully justify only certain kinds of in nite non-subset
comparisons, by utilizing relative rates, limits, and measures when they are available.

Fine-Tuning and Coarse-Tuning
Another issue involving in nity, known as the normalizability problem or the problem of in nite ranges, is
raised as an objection to the argument from cosmological ne-tuning to the existence of either God or a
multiverse. Physicists in recent decades have discovered that for many constants of physical laws and initial
conditions of the universe, if those constants or initial conditions were only very slightly di erent from
what they actually are, life that utilized complex chemistry of any sort could not exist (see Collins 2009 for
an overview of the scienti c evidence and the argument). Proponents of the ne-tuning argument (FTA)
take this set of discoveries as a premise for a probabilistic argument that says that given how extremely
unlikely it would be that the constants and initial conditions be in such a tiny life-permitting region of
values in a single atheistic universe, the facts of ne-tuning give evidential support for a God who
intentionally set these constants so life could exist, or for a multiverse in which it was very likely that at
least one universe with life-permitting constants would exist, or, combining these hypotheses, a theistic
multiverse.
To arrive at the improbability of a constant being in that tiny life-permitting region, we need to have a
range of that constant’s possible values, with the life-friendly region constituting only a sliver of it. Any
nite limit for this range of possible values would be arbitrary without some principled reason for such a
limit, so it seems the comparison range should be in nite. However, in nite ranges cause trouble for
probabilities, as the physicist Paul Davies points out:
The problem is that there is no natural way to quantify the intrinsic improbability of the known
“coincidences”. From what range might the value of, say, the strength of the nuclear force (which
xes the position of the Hoyle resonances, for example) be selected? If the range is

in nite,

then any nite range of values might be considered to have zero probability of being selected. But
then we should be equally surprised however weakly the requirements for life constrain those
values. This is surely a reductio ad absurdum of the whole argument.
(1992, 204–5)
Philosophers have elaborated on this problem. Neil Manson argues that if we accept an epistemic probability
of 0 for any nite range to be selected from an in nite range, then it becomes too easy to get a good netuning argument; we guarantee it “on the cheap”:
all one would need do is show that there is at least one cosmic parameter for which life constrains
the possible values to a nite interval. Then one would have shown that the probability of a life-

permitting universe is zero no matter how large that interval. Furthermore, there would be no need
to nd any further cases of ne-tuning2, for no additional evidence could make it any less likely on
the chance hypothesis that the universe is such as to permit life.

(Manson 2000, 347)
Yet many philosophers and cosmologists believe that having multiple ne-tuned parameters that are
physically independent of each other does add further weight to the force of the ne-tuning argument.
Timothy McGrew, Lydia McGrew, and Eric Vestrup emphasize the non-normalizability of an in nite range:
Probabilities make sense only if the sum of the logically possible disjoint alternatives adds up to
one—if there is, to put the point more colloquially, some sense that attaches to the idea that the
various possibilities can be put together to make up one hundred percent of the probability space.
But if we carve an in nite space up into equal nite-sized regions, we have in nitely many of
them; and if we try to assign them each some xed positive probability, however small, the sum of
these is in nite.
(McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup 2001, 1031)
If, on the other hand, we assign to each nite-sized region a probability of 0, there is no way we can get to 1
for the whole range, since the sum of even an in nite number of 0s is still 0. So there seems to be no way to
use standard probability theory to deal with in nite ranges. What if we were to use limits, as I did in the
earlier section on measuring knowledge, and extrapolate from how the probability behaves as the size of a
nite comparison range approaches in nity? The limit of the probability would be 0, and the McGrews and
Vestrup o er their own version of the reductio Davies and Manson suggest, coining the commonly used
name for it.
For using such reasoning we can also underwrite what we shall call the “Coarse-Tuning
Argument”. Suppose … the various parameters, rather than being constrained to within tiny
intervals around those that characterize our own universe, could take any values within a few
billion orders of magnitude of our values. It is hard to imagine anyone’s being surprised at the
existence of a life-friendly universe under such circumstances. Yet the “ball” in this case is
K

isomorphic to the ball in the FTA: both of them have measure zero in R+ . In consequence, any
inference we can draw from ne-tuning is not only paralleled by a coarse-tuning argument; it also
has precisely the same probabilistic force … we are confronted with an unhappy conditional:

if

the FTA is a good argument, so is the CTA. And conversely, if the CTA is not a good argument,
neither is the FTA.
(McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup 2001, 1032)
Surprisingly, several prominent defenders of the ne-tuning argument embrace the conclusion of what is
intended to be a reductio. Robin Collins (2005, 403), Je rey Koperski (2005, 310–12), and Alexander Pruss
(2005, 415, 421) each propose tweaked versions of probability theory that avoid the normalizability problem
(for example, Pruss drops countable additivity) and say that the probability of any nite region with an
in nite comparison range and even probability distribution is 0. And each of them bites the bullet and
embraces the claim that the coarse-tuning argument is a good one and is just as strong as the ne-tuning
argument. Collins says we “just have to conclude that our initial impressions were wrong that it was the
smallness of the range, not its niteness, that gave the FTA its force” (2005, 404).
This willingness to bite the bullet is puzzling, and I side with the McGrews when they argue that:
all of the excitement about the FTA has centered on the alleged narrowness of the life-friendly
regions … We doubt that anyone would have considered the CTA to be even a possible argument for
design were it not for the objections that have been raised against the FTA.
(McGrew and McGrew 2005, 433)
I want to emphasize the oddness of the claim that the CTA is not only a good argument, but is equal in
strength to the FTA, or, for that matter, every other similar argument with a nite range, no matter how
large its size. It seems obvious to me that if we were to discover further physical constants that required

independent ne-tuning for life, or if we found that the life-permitting ranges of the known ne-tuned
constants and initial conditions are substantially narrower than physicists currently believe, the FTA would
be substantially strengthened.

Even if the CTA proponents’ non-standard probability theories say that the probability of an extremely
narrow region is precisely the same as the probability of a much larger one, both 0, they are clearly not the
same in all probabilistic respects. Suppose an in nitely sharp dart is thrown randomly at a square (see
Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1

The probability of the dart hitting anywhere on the left edge of the square, AC, is 0, as is the probability of it
hitting the upper half of that edge, AB. But there is a conditional

probability of 0.5 that the dart hits the
11

upper half of that edge (AB) given that the dart hits somewhere along the whole edge, AC.

P(AC) = 0

P(AB) = 0

P(AB|AC) = 0.5

Even if the absolute probabilities of hitting AC (the left edge) and hitting AB (the top half of AC) both are 0,
this does not mean there is no probabilistic di erence between them. The dart is twice as likely to hit
somewhere along the whole left edge as it is to hit the top half of the left edge. Both standard and CTAfriendly probability theories fail to capture this di erence.
In fact, there are an in nite number of di erent levels of absolute probability 0. Add another dimension to
the square we have been considering and suppose we randomly choose a point in the resulting cube (see
Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2

The probability of the point being anywhere on its shaded front face, ACDE, is 0. The probability of it being
along one of that face’s edges, AC, is also 0. Yet there is an even greater conditional probability disparity
here than in the square case, since the probability of the point being on the edge AC conditional on the point
being on the face ACDE is 0, not the non-zero conditional probability of the dart hitting AB on it hitting AC
along the edge of the square:

P(AC|ACDE) = 0

P(AB|AC) = 0.5

So the randomly chosen point landing on the cube’s face is in nitely more likely than it landing on the edge,
and yet their absolute probabilities are still both 0. And we can iterate this procedure to higher and higher
dimensional spaces to produce an in nite number of levels of absolute probability 0 that still have very
di erent conditional probabilities.
Mark Colyvan, Jay Gar eld, and Graham Priest also press normalizability objections against the FTA, but
they point out an important fact:
Admittedly, the problem here has nothing to do with the ne-tuning argument; it concerns
(standard) probability theory. Indeed, similar reasoning shows that an in nitely sharp dart cannot
hit a dart board, no matter how big the board is; or that no one can win a lottery that has in nitely
many tickets. It’s true that such paradoxes of probability theory are well known and that there does
not seem to be any consensus on how they are to be resolved.
(2005, 327)
Since this is a problem in probability theory that everyone needs solved, whatever the solution turns out to
be for these standard paradoxes, it would likely help with the in nite ranges in the ne-tuning argument.
After all, the in nite range problem is quite analogous to in nite lottery cases. There is clearly a di erence
between the probability of winning an in nite lottery where only two tickets are drawn as winners and a
googol

lottery where a googolplex (10

100

or 1010

100

, a 1 with 10

zeros after it) tickets are chosen. One’s surprise

at winning should be far greater in the two-winners lottery scenario. After all, there are half a googolplex
times more winners in the googolplex lottery than there are in the two-winner lottery.
While I am not in a position to resolve the more general problem for probability theory in this chapter, I
want to point to what I believe to be a major source of the problem as well as a promising direction to
pursue. In the section on measuring knowledge, we saw that subtraction involving in nities is inconsistent.
Similar problems arise when dividing by in nities. Consider these sets: the natural numbers, the even

natural numbers, and the set of natural numbers divisible by 10. All these sets have the same Cantorian
cardinality, and so thinking about division one way, we might think that taking any one of these sets and
dividing it by any other (or by itself) should always give us 1. But from another perspective, the subset
perspective, dividing di erent pairs of these sets should give us di erent results. The positive evens divided
by the natural numbers should give us 0.5, the set of natural numbers divisible by 10 divided by the natural
numbers should give us 0.1, while the natural numbers divided by the evens should give us 2. This last
example mirrors my case of angel A knowing the names of all the natural numbers, while angel B only
knows the names of the evens; it is natural to say that A knows twice as many names as B does, and that the
ratio of how much B knows to how much A knows (with regards to the names of numbers) is 1/2.

The question of how to divide with in nities is clearly relevant to the in nite range objection to the netuning argument (as well as the in nite lottery paradox), and developing an alternative probability theory
based on a subset extension instead of the standard correspondence one may be key to resolving these
paradoxes of in nity. In fact, a group of mathematicians and philosophers have recently been working on a
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theory like this, which they call “numerosity theory” (Benci, Horsten, and Wenmackers 2013).
early days for this theory, and to evaluate it goes beyond

It is still

the scope of this chapter, but if it does succeed,

it may provide the probabilistic foundations for a version of the ne-tuning argument that deals gracefully
with in nite ranges and yet does not require that coarse-tuning arguments be just as strong as the FTA.
In the meantime, let me o er some considerations for why the CTA should not be considered to be just as
strong as the FTA. Let w be the width of the wide life-permitting range RW in the CTA, while n is the width of
the narrow life-permitting range RN of the FTA, and RW includes all of RN. Suppose n is several billion times
smaller than w. For any nite comparison range larger than w, the ratio of the probability of the constant
being in RN to the probability of the constant being in RW is n/w. As the size r of the comparison range grows
towards in nity, the individual probabilities get increasingly closer to 0, but their ratio remains constant.

lim P(RN ) = 0

r→∞

lim P(RW ) = 0

r→∞

lim

P(RN )

r→∞ P(RW )

=

n
w

At in nity, we have a choice between extensions for how the ratio will behave, similar to the choice we had
for limits in the previous section of the chapter.
We saw there that the subset extension agrees with limit behavior (at least in the sense of which of two
quantities is greater or if they are equal), in contrast to the one-to-one correspondence extension, which
allows for in nite behavior that is radically di erent from limit behavior. With the widening-gap cases (the
revolutions of Jupiter vs. the xed stars and the men in hell for di ering numbers of days per year), the
subset extension gave the correct answer. In the square dartboard case, the dart is twice as likely to hit
somewhere along the whole left edge as it is to hit the top half of the left edge, even if the absolute
probabilities for these two possibilities are both 0. Consider taking just the left edge as a line segment,
getting rid of the rest of the square. The dart now always lands somewhere on that line segment. The
absolute probabilities of a dart hitting somewhere on that line segment and it hitting its top half are 1 and
0.5. Moving from this nite case back to an in nite one by adding back the rest of the square does change
the absolute probabilities back to 0, but the ratio, and hence the relative probabilities of hitting those line
segments, remains the same. This seems to tell against a choice of extension at in nity that would lead to
discontinuous behavior of the ratio.
What’s more, we can run a conditional probability argument similar to the dart example when comparing a
wide life-permitting range RW with a narrow life-permitting range RN. Even with an in nite comparison
range, the conditional probability that a randomly chosen number lies in RN given that it lies in the larger
13

RW, will be n/w. Since n is several billion times smaller than w, that conditional probability will be tiny.
we

If

go the other way, the conditional probability of being in RW on a number having been randomly

selected in RN will always be 1 because of the superset relation the larger range has to the smaller one. This
disparity in conditional probabilities will indicate which range has the larger relative probability and by how
much, as long as there is a proper subset relation between the two nite ranges. Why? Because no matter
what the absolute probabilities are, if the conditional probability of a number in RN being picked given that a
number was randomly chosen in RW is tiny, then it is that much less likely for the number to fall in RN than
it is to fall somewhere in RW.

Furthermore, we can compare the epistemic impacts of di erent possible pieces of evidence on hypotheses
using only ratios of Bayesian likelihoods. The ratio of the widths of RN and RW, n/w, can then be used to
show how big the ratios of likelihoods is between the evidence of ne-tuning and the evidence of coarsetuning, and thus their relative evidential force. Let’s start with the relative odds form of Bayes Theorem:
P(H1 |E)
P(H2 |E)

=

P(H1 )

P(E|H1 )

P(H2 )

P(E|H2 )

The following are the ratios of the posterior probabilities of the disjunctive hypothesis theism or multiverse
(TM) and the single naturalistic universe hypothesis (S) after conditionalizing on the discovery of coarsetuning (C) compared with conditionalizing on the discovery of ne-tuning (F):

P(TM|C)
P(S|C)

=

P(TM|F)
P(S|F)

=

P(TM)

P(C|TM)

P(S)

P(C|S)

P(TM)

P(F|TM)

P(S)

P(F|S)

To see the relative evidential impact of coarse-tuning vs. ne-tuning, we divide these two ratios and get:

P(TM|C)
P(S|C)
P(TM|F)

=

P(C|TM)

P(F|S)

P(F|TM)

P(C|S)

P(S|F)

What is the value of the second term P(F|S)/P(C|S)? If we calculate the constituent probabilities individually
and then attempt to divide, both will be 0 and we cannot divide by 0. However, if we use the subset extension
in light of my arguments regarding conditional probabilities and the limit behavior of the ratio of
probabilities, we can avoid the division by 0 and directly conclude that P(F|S)/P(C|S) is n/w.
Since n/w is so extremely close to 0, the rst term P(C|TM)/P(F|TM) would have to be enormous to bring
the entire expression anywhere close to 1. But a coarse-tuned

universe would not be more likely than a

ne-tuned universe on theism being true or a multiverse existing. If anything, ne-tuning may be more
14

likely on theism than coarse-tuning.

So P(C|TM)/P(F|TM) is close to 1 or far less than 1. In either case,

multiplying this value with a miniscule n/w will result in an equally tiny or even smaller number than n/w.
The product of these two terms gives us the ratio of the evidential impact of coarse-tuning to the impact of
ne-tuning. Since this ratio is so small, there should be a tremendous di erence between the epistemic
15

e ects of the discovery of coarse-tuning and the discovery of ne-tuning.
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I argue for this in “The Nature and Desiderata of Epistemic Expertise” (dra ).
All other things being equal, of course. Some beliefs are more important or cover more territory regarding reality, while
other beliefs are trivial and inconsequential. As I mentioned, I will ignore this importance dimension for the purposes of
this chapter, but that dimension could be incorporated by weighting beliefs by their importance. When we compare how
much cash two individuals have, we take the number of coins and bills they possess and weight them by their respective
monetary values. If we are dealing with only coins that all have the same monetary value, e.g., pennies, then simply
comparing the number of coins two individuals have will give us the right answer.
Even if the correct view of mental representation does not entail finite minds having infinitely many beliefs, Treanor could
begin his argument using non-omniscient non-human beings that know an infinite number of truths, such as angels, and
then rely on the ignorance version of his argument for finite human knowledge.
Patrick Grim has argued against the existence of a set of all truths (1984; 1991), appealing to Cantorʼs Theorem, which
states that the powerset P(S) of a set S has a greater cardinality than S. Any candidate for the set of all sets will then be
smaller than its powerset, and so will not be the set of all sets. Since there are truths associated with each set (such as set
S not being an electron), Grim argues there cannot be a set of all truths. Di erent responses have been put forward to
Grimʼs claim. One approach is to use other axiomatizations of set theory, such as Quineʼs New Foundations, which allow
for a set of all sets. As Grim notes, they have some undesirable mathematical consequences. But there may be still other
(yet unconceived) axiomatizations that allow for a set of all sets and do not have these negative consequences.
Whichever way that debate turns out, I do not have to rely on a set of all truths for my purposes here; it is Treanorʼs
reductio that utilizes the notion of a set of all the truths. For the sake of argument, I will proceed with the assumption that
we can somehow coherently talk about the set of all truths. But even if it turns out that there cannot be a set of all truths,
Treanor could modify his reductio so that instead of utilizing a set of all truths, he uses a set of truths that is infinite while
not including all the truths (for example, the union of all the truths believed by any human being who has ever lived
together with an infinite set of arithmetic truths, such as whether each natural number is a prime or not).
Also, the total number of books we have taken out a er an infinite number of such removals will be precisely the same as
the number of books taken out during the first removal.
In the United States alone, the Books In Print database says that 304,912 new titles and editions were published in 2013.
This does not include the estimated 1,108,183 self-published and on-demand books produced that year
(http://www.bowker.com/news/2014/Traditional-Print-Book-Production-Dipped-Slightly-in-2013.html).
In correspondence, Treanor questions whether my book argument is parallel to his argument. He considers his T3 and T5
intuitively true, acceptable to anyone regardless of their views on infinity and cardinality, but he argues that my B3 and B5
require a non-Cantorian way of thinking about infinity. Naturally, I disagree. T3, B3, T5, and B5 are all expressions of pretheoretic common-sense intuitions we have about how much knowledge and ignorance we have at di erent times and
how many written and unwritten books there have been, as well as the relationships between these quantities. The
conflicts between these pre-theoretic intuitions and the conclusions reached via Cantorian cardinality (T2 and B2) are
needed to drive the arguments. If one considered T3 from a Cantorian perspective instead of the common-sense one, then
they would reject T3, since as a good Cantorian, they would say that they are not any less ignorant than their ten-year-old
self given the infinite cardinalities involved (recall that T1 supposes that cardinality is the measure of ignorance). So if my
B3 is actually dependent on an explicitly non-Cantorian perspective as Treanor argues, his T3 is just as dependent on such
a view (similar considerations apply to B5 and T5), preserving the symmetry between the two arguments.
It is inconsistent at least in sometimes giving us sets of di ering cardinalities a er removing from the same set two sets S1
and S2 that have the same cardinality, as in Craigʼs library example. We expect that subtraction should always give the
same-sized remainder when the cardinalities of the minuend and subtrahend do not change; it should not matter which
members of a set are removed, only that the same number of members are removed. But these expectations are not
satisfied in Cantorian set theory.
Matthew Parker discusses a number of historical figures, dating back to the medievals, who wrestled with these concepts
(Parker 2009). Cantor put it this way: “the whole concept of number … in a certain sense splits up into two concepts when
we ascend to the infinite” (Cantor [1883] 1976, 78, Cantorʼs emphasis, quoted in Parker, 82). He was here thinking of his
definition of cardinal numbers and what he termed ordinal numbers. Ordinal numbers can label elements of ordered sets
and designate the length of such sets, and there are ordinal numbers that are between infinite cardinal numbers. For
example, the ordering <0, 1, 2, … > has an ordinal length of one less than the ordinal length of <1, 2, 3, … , 0>. Both include
an infinite series of numbers, but only the second ordering has an additional item that follows a er that series (Moore
2001, 123–7, 53). So Cantor recognized that for ordered sets at least, sets that had the same infinite cardinality could be
di erent in another way of measuring their size. Ordinal size does not help us with the present epistemic problem,
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however, since it is sensitive to rearrangement. As seen in the example above, the two orderings have the very same
members, but the moving of 0 to the end makes their ordinal size di erent.
If it turns out that there cannot be a set of all truths (see n. 4), we could still talk about our ignorance decreasing by
adopting the alternate approach I suggested in that note: using narrower but still infinitely large sets of truths instead of a
set of all truths. For example, when I learn that 9791 is a prime number, there is one less truth that I am ignorant of in the
infinite set composed of truths of the forms n is a prime number and n is not a prime number.
The square dartboard example is originally from Russell and Hawthorne (2016); similar examples are o ered by Hájek
(2003, 289), including one originally from Émile Borel, where the probability that a randomly chosen point on the Earthʼs
surface lies on the equator is 0 and yet the probability that it lies in the western hemisphere is 0.5 given that it lies on the
equator.
Thanks to Alan Hájek for informing me of the existence of that project.

This tiny conditional probability also tells us that the absolute probability of the constant falling in RN with an infinite
comparison range has to be tiny: it has to be less than or equal to n/w, since the absolute probability of the constant
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falling in RW, whatever it is, cannot be greater than 1.
My paper “Preferring Stringent Laws of Nature: A Response to Weisberg on Fine Tuning” (dra ) o ers several reasons why
God might prefer physical laws that require fine-tuning for life over laws that are not at all stringent in that sense.
Note that even if coarse-tuning were somehow more likely on TM than fine-tuning, it seems very unlikely that it would be
so much more likely than fine-tuning as to counterbalance how tiny n/w is. The product of the likelihood ratios would still
be far less than 1, which is all we need to show that coarse-tuning and fine-tuning should have di erent epistemic
impacts.
Thanks to Alvin Plantinga, Robert Audi, and Patricia Blanchette for careful readings and discussions of portions of this
chapter. The New Insights reading group o ered helpful suggestions, especially Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini,
Matthew Benton, and Max Baker-Hytch. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers and Nick Treanor for their comments.
Finally, thanks to Je rey Sanford Russell for discussions regarding his square dartboard example. This publication was
also made possible in part through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed
in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.

